pryor v state

Posted on October 8th, 2020

662, 660 A.2d 1068 (1995), and in Whitehead, supra, this Court reversed violations of the Maryland Controlled Dangerous Substances Act that were based on evidence turned up during searches of automobiles that had been lawfully stopped by officers who witnessed the driver violate a traffic law. Trusty v. State, 308 Md. After the trial, Pryor filed a civil action against Value City, the alleged victim in the underlying criminal case. ���J The informant provided Detective Griffin with appellant's address as well as the make and model of appellant's automobile, and also said that appellant stored his cocaine in a secret compartment within the dash of that automobile. It is not about controlling commerce in sex.

0000002078 00000 n The police did not have a right to subject appellant to the functional equivalent of two successive periods of detention. Sometime in August of 1995, Detective Scott Griffin of the Baltimore County Police Department was told by a confidential informant that appellant was "selling a large quantity of cocaine in the Frederick Road area of Catonsville." 0000016271 00000 n No transcript was created in light of Pryor's acquittal. This is an insufficient justification for the statute after Lawrence. 243, 578 A.2d 816 (1990), in Munafo v. State, 105 Md.App. 1996); Callins v. State, 698 So.2d 883 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997),citing Tillman v. State, 471 So.2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1985). Unlike the cases in which a motorist is stopped on a mere "hunch" that illegal activity will be discovered, Detective Griffin's independent verification of the detailed information supplied by his confidential informant was more than sufficient to establish the reasonable articulable suspicion required for a forcible stop of appellant's vehicle. 221, 226-227, 550 A.2d 670(1988). An appeal from the District Court of Oklahoma County; James L. Gullett, District Judge. Scales v. State, 13 Md.App. %PDF-1.6 %���� The statute also does not restrict possession or use of a sexual device by an individual, but only the commercial distribution of the devices. At the suppression hearing, the State, appellant's counsel, and the court agreed that this case was controlled by Munafo v. State, 105 Md.App. [5]Goode v. State, 41 Md.App. Panel: 0000017100 00000 n x�bbRb`b``Ń3Υ�y �n) 582, 587, 611 A.2d 592 (1992). In fact, Pryor moved that the trial be recorded and transcribed, and it was taken down on her behalf. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991). However, that case made clear that express refusal to participate in the cost of the takedown was required. A search of that area turned up a *341 hidden compartment in which crack cocaine had been secreted.[2]. In Reliable Consultants Inc. v. Earle, on February 12, 2008, the 5th Circuit overturned the Texas ban on the sale of sex toys using the similar facts that failed in the above appeal.

2d 889 (1968) applies to occupants of automobiles, Judge Moylan "noted that an occupant of an automobile is just as subject to a reasonable `stop' and to a reasonable `frisk' as is a pedestrian." %PDF-1.6 %���� 668(1), 269 S.E.2d 518 (1980). Vendors and users of such devices filed a constitutional challenge to the statute in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama against William H. Pryor, Jr., in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of Alabama. stark county, case no. The record does not contain Pryor's indictment or the verdict;  however, we will assume that Pryor's statement of the case is correct because the state did not file a brief in response to her appeal.

[6] If the K-9 had been present at the moment of the stop, or arrived during the period of permissible detention, its "perimeter search" of appellant's vehicle would have been entirely proper.

*343 Whren, supra, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. <<8371CEFA25DAF049A80FB49F525CC2D3>]>> In this case, Detective Griffin and his fellow investigating officers had every right to be at the elbow of the uniformed officer who stopped appellant's vehicle, to "accost" appellant and the occupants of his vehicle, and to ask appellant for consent to search the vehicle. Decided: January 21, 2005 Farnham & Rothenberg, David J. Farnham, Michael L. Rothenberg, Roswell, for Appellant.

[7] In any event, no incriminating evidence was observed in open view.

A police officer who has made a lawful stop of an automobile has every right to look "through the window into the interior of the car (with or without a) flashlight ... (just as) every member of the public (has) a right to do," and to thereafter search the automobile if the look through the window establishes probable cause for such action. Under Whren, the law enforcement officer who observes a traffic violation may stop the violator, even though the officer does so out of curiosity as to whether (or in the hope that) the stop will lead to the discovery of other incriminating evidence. endstream endobj 39 0 obj <> endobj 40 0 obj <> endobj 41 0 obj <>stream Murphy, C.J., Hollander, J., and Marvin H. Smith, Judge (Retired), Specially Assigned. McMillian v. State, 325 Md. Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals Decisions. In this case, however, there was no reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that a stop of appellant's vehicle, and/or a frisk of its occupants, was necessary for the officers' safety. The State's evidence was sufficient to establish his guilt of that offense.

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